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GRECIA: continua la fuga di capitali. Possibile applicazione “modello Cipro”?
Scritto il 27 Marzo 2015 alle 17:15 da
Un forte silenzio aleggia nelle stanze di Bruxelles. Tutti sono in attesa di lunedì prossimo, data in cui il governo greco presenterà ai partner dell’Eurozona quel famoso documento con all’interno l’elenco delle riforme strutturali, probabilmente “promesse da marinaio” ma condizione necessaria per poi ottenere una nuova tranche di aiuti.
Come è normale che sia, girano voci su come sarà strutturata questa lettera di “buone intenzioni” : tasse sul turismo, aumento dell’età pensionabile, più una stretta su quello che da sempre è tutelato in modo “non ufficiale” dai governi di Atene, in modo indifendibile: antiriciclaggio, evasione fiscale e tutto quanto ne consegue.
Da buon San Tommaso occorre aspettare prima di credere. E anche quando avremo visto la letterina di Tsipras io continuerò a non credere ad Atene. Però la Troika (non ditelo ai greci che l’ho chiamata così…) ci dovrà credere e via, nuova tranche di aiuti e nuova boccata di ossigeno fino alla prossima puntata, forse a luglio.
Ricordate questa timeline? Vel a ripropongo.
Timeline crisi Grecia: i prossimi mesi da affrontare per Atene (CLICCA PER INGRANDIRE)
E mentre si legge di “virtual-pacche” sulle spalle tra il premier Greco e la cancelliera tedesche, entrambi con tante belle e buone intenzioni “a parole”, andiamo sul concreto, ovvero sul fatto che i capitali stanno continuando a fuggire da Atene (cosa tasserà Tsipras ora che i ricchi. i soldi, li hanno portati via? Ricordo che la Grecia ha volontariamente interrotto i colloqui coi paradisi fiscali, vedi Svizzera, per eventuali “voluntary disclosures”. Tutto detto.)
A febbraio, tanto per intenderci, i depositi bancari sono diminuiti di ulteriori 7.8 miliardi di Euro, fonte BCE. Intanto però la stessa BCE aiuta le banche con ulteriori iniezioni di liquidità, avendo aumentato il tetto dell’ELA a 71 miliardi di Euro (recente un’aggiunta di 1.2 miliardi).
Tanto per capirci, la BCE finanzia i clienti delle banche che stanno esportando i loro capitali all’estero, capitali che fuggono dalla Grecia per evitare default o tassazioni strane. Se facciamo una somma con quanto è stato prelevato dagli sportelli a gennaio arriviamo a 20 miliardi di Euro da inizio anno.
Quadretto che mi fa sorridere, con la BCE che indirettamente aiuta gli esportatori di capitali. Tanto che non escluderei, nel caso in cui i colloqui della settimana prossima dovessero andare MALE, si prenda una decisione molto drastica. Per farla breve, la BCE potrebbe anche stufarsi ed imporre il “modello Cipro”. Ricordate? Sportelli chiusi per evitare fughe di capitali. Ma questo solo se il feeling Atene-Bruxelles subisce una violenta interruzione.
Fanta finanza? Per carità, ho già anche visto di peggio. E visto che la crisi greca è irrisolvibile, non escludo proprio nulla, anche se un comico compromesso è molto probabile (meno male, così la festa sui mercati può continuare).
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5 commenti Commenta
atomictonto
Scritto il 28 Marzo 2015 at 05:57
Grazie @Surfer
Again what is the advantage of having Greece in the euro currency?
The same of having a hole in your kayak during a rowing contest.
Other contestants do have holes but the are smarter and more or less fix the flaw or at least hide it well (like California in the US…). 🙂
Scritto il 28 Marzo 2015 at 17:07
Atomictonto,
game over without even playing, you know! Always – and not just if you want to compare it to Greece.
California is one of the 10 Largest Economies in the World with a Gross State Product (GSP) of over $2 trillion.
As is described at length in several reports, California’s economy is more diversified than ever before, and the State’s prosperity is tied to exports and imports of both goods and services by California-based Companies, to exports and imports through California’s transportation gateways, and to inflows and outflows of human and capital resources.
Although trade is a nationally determined policy issue, its impact on California is immense.
California’s exports of merchandise in 2014 totaled $174.1 billion.
The State’s largest market was Mexico. California posted merchandise exports of $25.4 billion to Mexico in 2014, representing 14.6% of the State’s total merchandise exports. Mexico was followed by Canada ($18.2 billion), China ($16.1 billion), Japan ($12.3 billion), and Korea ($8.6 billion).
Total exports from California helped contribute to the RECORD-setting value of U.S. goods and services exports in 2014, which reached $2.35 trillion.
Nationally, U.S. jobs supported by exports reached an estimated 11.3 million in 2013, up 1.6 million since 2009.
U.S. goods exports to current FTA partners SUPPORTED an estimated 3.2 million jobs NATIONALLY.
In 2013, goods exports from the state of California SUPPORTED an estimated 802 thousand U.S. jobs.
l- – – – –
U.S. Department of Commerce (Staff, Trade Policy and Analysis, International Trade Administration, the), “California: expanding exports and supporting jobs through trade agreements” – February 26, 2015
http://www.trade.gov/mas/ian/build/groups/public/@tg_ian/documents/webcontent/tg_ian_005318.pdf
– – – – -l
サーファー © Surfer
Scritto il 28 Marzo 2015 at 17:09
The article and report kit below, finally, outlines long-term challenges for California, including water – show the positive and negative sides of the State.
l-1-l M. A. Winkler (Bloomberg View, the) “Best State for business? Yes, California” – March 12, 2015
http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-03-12/best-state-for-business-yes-california;
l-2-l Public Policy Institute of California (Staff PPIC , the), “California’s future” – February 2015
http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_215BKR.pdf .
Have a good and thorough reading for the weekend, now.
サーファー © Surfer [Saluti a Tutti]
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D. Renwick, E. Ahmed, T. Stringer (Fitch, Ratings Inc, Limited, the), “Downgrades Greece’s Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) to CCC” – March 27, 2015
_^
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Greece’s Long-term foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) to “CCC” from “B”.
The issue ratings on Greece’s senior unsecured foreign and local currency bonds are also downgraded to “CCC” from “B”.
The Short-term foreign currency IDR has been downgraded to “C” from “B”.
The Country Ceiling has been revised to “B-” from “BB”.
Under EU credit rating agency (CRA) regulation, the publication of sovereign reviews is subject to restrictions and must take place according to a published schedule, except where it is necessary for CRAs to deviate from this in order to comply with their legal obligations.
Fitch interprets this provision as allowing us to publish a rating review in situations where there is a material change in the creditworthiness of the issuer that we believe makes it inappropriate for us to wait until the next scheduled review date to update the rating or Outlook/Watch status.
The next scheduled review date for Fitch’s sovereign rating on Greece is 15 May 2015, but Fitch believes that developments in Greece warrant such a deviation from the calendar and our rationale for this is laid out below.
– KEY RATING DRIVERS –
The downgrade reflects the following key rating drivers and their relative weights:
High
Lack of market access, uncertain prospects of timely disbursement from official institutions, and tight liquidity conditions in the domestic banking sector have put extreme pressure on Greek government funding.
We expect that the government will survive the current liquidity squeeze without running arrears on debt obligations, but the heightened risks have led us to downgrade the ratings.
The damage to investor, consumer, and depositor confidence has almost certainly derailed Greece’s incipient economic recovery.
The damage will take time to repair even if prospects for a successful programme completion improve over the coming days or weeks.
We have revised down our growth forecast significantly to 0.5% this year from 1.5% in January 2015 and 2.5% in December 2014, with risks to growth on the downside.
Liquidity conditions faced by firms will have worsened substantially, in our view, due to increased government arrears to suppliers and bank funding strains.
The agreement reached in February to extend the EFSF programme to end-June after several weeks of brinkmanship supports our base case scenario that Greece and its creditors will ultimately reach a compromise deal.
However, progress since then has been slow.
It is unclear when the earliest disbursement could take place and what will be required for this to happen.
In the coming days, Greece has been asked to submit a more detailed list of reforms to the Eurogroup. If this is accepted, it would bring the government closer to a partial disbursement before fully completing the programme review.
However, in our view, it is likely that the Eurogroup will want the Greek government to demonstrate they have implemented some part of this list before funds are disbursed.
This pushes back the probable disbursement date well into April at the earliest.
Greece faces repayments to the IMF of €450mln in April, €750mln in May and €1.5bn in June.
Debt repayments in July and August rise to €4.0bn and EUR3.2bn, respectively, primarily due to bonds held by the Eurosystem falling due.
We expect the government to continue to run arrears to suppliers to offset weaker-than-budgeted cash revenues and provide room for debt service.
Large-scale deposit outflows from Greek banks (we estimate a 15% decline in the deposit base since end-November) have added to pressures on the Greek economy.
Fitch’s Banking System Indicator for Greece is “B”, indicating weak standalone creditworthiness.
The “B” Viability Ratings of the four main domestic banks are currently on Rating Watch Negative due to heightened funding and liquidity risks.
The banks are adequately capitalised but their asset quality is weak and may deteriorate further this year.
While not our expectation, there is risk of capital controls being introduced to curb deposit outflows from the domestic banks. This risk has led us to revise down our Country Ceiling to “B-“.
Greece’s “CCC” IDRs also reflect the following key rating drivers:
The state budget delivered a primary surplus (programme definition) of 0.3% of GDP in 2014, the second year of surplus.
This is below the programme target of 1.5% due to the non-payment by the Eurosystem of the rebate on SMP holdings of debt and weaker revenues.
Even assuming an agreement with the official sector is forthcoming, it will be challenging to maintain a primary surplus this year as weaker domestic demand and tighter private Sector liquidity will erode tax revenues.
Greece’s external debt burden is heavy but inexpensive to service due to its largely concessionary nature. Greece is running a current account surplus of 1% of GDP, aided by reduced imports, buoyant tourism receipts in 2014 and a significant step-up in net EU transfers.
The economy has adjusted substantially over the past five years through nominal price and wage declines, although the export base remains narrow.
Although below the eurozone average, income per capita and governance compares favourably with “CCC” and “B” range peers. However, these structural strengths are not drivers of the ratings at this point given the prevalence of near-term event risk.
– RATING SENSITIVITIES –
Developments that could, individually or collectively, result in a further downgrade include:
1- A break-down in negotiations between Greece and its creditors leading to alternative solutions being formally considered, for example a debt moratorium or restructuring of Greece’s debt stock including bonds held by the private sector
2- Arrears to the IMF would not in and of themselves constitute a rating default. However, it would nonetheless be credit-negative and could lead to a further downgrade.
3- An exit from the Eurozone, making the risk of a default event on privately held Greek bonds probable.
Future developments that could, individually or collectively, result in an upgrade include:
l- An agreement between Greece and its official creditors unlocking delayed programme disbursements and a further agreement on the terms of a follow-up arrangement.
This would probably take the form, if not the title, of a third programme of policy-conditional financial support.
l- An acceleration of Greece’s economic recovery, further primary surpluses, and official Sector debt relief (OSI) would put upward pressure on the ratings over the medium term.
– KEY ASSUMPTIONS –
The ratings and Outlook are sensitive to a number of key assumptions:
Greek banks make no further material demands on the sovereign balance sheet; 20% of GDP has been injected to date. If Greek banks incur losses that are not covered by private shareholders, this would lead to a cash call on the government as guaranteed tax credits are converted into equity.
General government gross debt/GDP peaked at 178% in 2014 and remains constant in 2015, before gradually subsiding. These assumptions do not factor in any OSI on official loans that may be agreed over the medium term. The projections are sensitive to assumptions about growth, the GDP deflator, Greece’s primary balance and the realisation of privatisation revenues.
The EFSF would not exercise its right to declare the €29.7bn PSI sweetener loan to be due and payable in the event that Greece begins to run arrears on IMF repayments. Such a declaration would trigger a cross-default clause in the privately-held new bonds issued in 2012, which Fitch rates.
^_
https://www.fitchratings.com/creditdesk/press_releases/detail.cfm?pr_id=982091
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